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This paper examines the ways in which a service provider’s policies on pricing and service
level aﬀect the size of its customer base and proﬁtability. The analysis begins with the
development of a customer behavior model that uses customer satisfaction and depth of
relationship as mediators of the impact of price and service level on proﬁtability. Based on
this model of customer behavior, the system is analyzed as a queueing network from which
the properties of the aggregate population’s behavior are derived. The analysis reveals the
counterintuitive result that a policy that involves a decrease in prices or an increase in
service level may lead to a smaller customer base. However, this policy may also lead to
higher proﬁts. The novelty of this result lies in the explanation of the phenomenon that
when the customer base decreases due to a change in prices or service quality, companies
may experience gains in proﬁt that result not from a decrease in costs associated with serving
fewer customers but from an increase in revenues resulting from the indirect eﬀects of the
lower prices or higher level of service on customer behavior. The application of optimization
techniques to the model developed in this paper yields optimality conditions through which
managers can assess the long-term proﬁtability of their pricing and service-level policies.
11 Introduction
This paper examines the impact of pricing and service quality on the size of the customer
base and proﬁtability. The setting in which the analysis takes place is a subscription-based,
capacity-constrained service. The focus is on understanding the interdependence of the
pricing policy and service level and their impact on customers’ potential to generate revenue
and customer behavior in terms of usage of the service. The key to the analysis is the
development of a model where customers choose the depth of their relationship with the
company based on their level of satisfaction. Deeper relationships increase the strain already
faced by a capacity-constrained service-delivery system. If customers are satisﬁed and choose
to pursue deeper relationships, the company will have to either lower its service quality or
make investments to improve capacity. This paper provides a mathematical model that
sheds light on the underlying dynamics governing such service-delivery systems, providing
useful insights into the optimality of price- and quality-based managerial decisions.
A recent study of a cellular phone company conducted by Bain & Company, Inc. revealed
instances when, within the same segment, customers with high usage levels were more likely
to churn than customers with lower usage levels. Bittencourt and Sellmeister Bueno (2003)
report a similiar ﬁnding in the ﬁnancial services industry. This is a surprising result, par-
ticularly in light of the homogeneity of preferences across the customers examined. The
p r e d o m i n a n tp a r a d i g mi st h a tc u s t o m e r sw h od o n ’ tu s eas e r v i c ev e r yo f t e na r et h eo n e s
most likely to defect. Customer satisfaction has been shown to have a positive impact on
both usage of services (e.g.: Heskett et al. 1994, Bolton and Lemon 1999) and customer
retention (e.g.: Jones and Sasser 1995). Gourville and Soman (2002) make the causal rela-
tionship more explicit when they show that the probability that customers will cancel their
membership to a service is inversely proportional to how often they use the service. Empiri-
cal support for this result comes from industries as diverse as health clubs (DellaVigna and
Malmendie 2001) and cable television (Lemon, White and Winer 2002).
The apparent incongruence between the managerial observations brought to our attention
and the academic predictions described above suggest that the relationship between service
quality, customer retention, service usage and proﬁtability could be more complex than
previously supposed. Indeed, one of the objectives of this paper is to show that results such as
those observed by Bain and by Bittercourt and Sellmeister Bueno (2003) are consistent with
rational customer behavior if we incorporate into our model the dynamics of the customer’s
2choice of depth of relationship.
The frequency with which customers choose to interact with companies is often considered
to be a reliable predictor of their lifetime value, a fact well known to the many managers
in the catalog industry who have been successfully using the RFM (recency, frequency, and
monetary value) framework for years. This follows from the intuition that customers who
are satisﬁed with a service are likely to use it more often. Customers who like their cellular
phones are more likely to use them in place of their regular phones, and those who like
pay-per-view movies will use this service more often than they will rent movies. However, as
customers use these services more often, they are increasingly more likely to erode the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts for at least two reasons. First, because the intrinsic variability of service-delivery
systems will lead to a higher number of service failures. Second, because the increased use of
a service facility can lead to either a decrease in supplier responsiveness and service quality
or higher costs in the form of further investments to prevent such failures.
Service quality is repeatedly cited (e.g., Rust et al. 1995, Bolton and Lemon 1999) to be
a key determinant of switching behavior. An increase in quality or a decrease in price will
make services more valuable to customers, but the eﬀects of these policies on the long-term
ﬁnancial performance of a ﬁrm are not easily determined. A decrease in price or increase
in service level may actually lead to a decrease in the size of the customer base. This can
happen because these policy changes may yield the expected result of increased usage, and
this puts a higher load on the system. Consequently, customers may experience more service
failures, which lead to lower levels of satisfaction, resulting in a decrease in the size of the
customer base in the long run. In this way, a managerial action which objectively gives more
value to customers may ultimately drive some of them away.
This result is important to managers seeking to maximize their customer base in pursuit
of higher proﬁts, but when examining how changes in price and service quality can impact
the size of the customer base, it is important to note that a decrease in the number of
customers does not always leads to lower proﬁts. The number of customers that a company
has can actually be a remarkably poor indicator of the value of the customer base. Financial
analysts often valued dotcoms based on their number of customers, and the market showed
its disapproval of this metric when the prices of such companies crashed (Gupta, Lehman,
and Stewart 2004). There is a complex relationship between pricing, service quality, and
proﬁtability, as the negative impact that changes (e.g., higher levels of quality) have on
proﬁt may have a revenue-based component as well as a cost-based component.
3This paper connects the operational decisions of pricing and service quality with the be-
havior of customers reacting to these policies. In order to study this problem, §2 reviews the
relevant literature from Marketing as well as Operations. Next, §3.1 develops the individual
customer behavior model that is consistent with the relevant results from the literature and
serves as the building block for the behavior of the customer base. Then, §3.2 shows how
aggregating several customers behaving according to this model leads to a population be-
havior model whose steady-state behavior (analyzed in §4) can account for the phenomena
observed by the companies described above. The analysis continues in §5, where the pric-
ing and service-quality decisions are analyzed through a nonlinear program whose objective
function is proﬁt maximization. Finally, §6 discusses the managerial and academic relevance
of these results and provides some directions for further research.
2 Literature Review
The range of issues addressed in this paper requires an interdisciplinary approach. Two
streams of research in the pricing literature are particularly relevant. First, the literature
from Operations Management and Queueing Theory informs our understanding of the impact
of pricing and service level on system load. Second, the study of two-part pricing structures
(mostly from Economics and Marketing) helps deﬁne the types of policies most suitable for
subscription services. This paper also draws on an already interdisciplinary stream of re-
search which studies the relationship between service quality, customer satisfaction, customer
loyalty, and proﬁtability.
Traditional Operations Management and Operations Research literature has focused on
optimizing the ﬁrm’s internal processes, making relatively simple assumptions about cus-
tomer behavior and the cost and impact of service quality (Bitran, Ferrer and Oliveira
2008). Within these ﬁelds, there is a signiﬁcant body of literature that analyzes queueing
systems where the arrival rate depends on pricing and waiting time. The use of pricing as a
mechanism for regulating the size of queues was ﬁrst studied by Naor (1969), who introduced
the notion of levying tolls to prevent customers from joining the queue during times of heavy
congestion. He showed that social optima can be achieved through tolls or administrative
constraints on the waiting space. Several papers generalized this model (e.g., Yechiali 1971,
Knudsen 1972, Edelson and Hildebrand 1975, Lipmann and Stidham 1977, Mendelson and
Yechiali 1981) by studying pricing decisions under ﬁxed capacity. More recent extensions
4include Van Mieghem’s (2000) addition of the managerial control of scheduling and Chen
and Frank’s (2001) model where managers observe queue length and dynamically adjust
their prices accordingly. Mendelson (1985) and Mendelson and Whang (1990) focused on
problems related to optimal pricing and capacity allocation. Dewan and Mendelson (1990)
extended these results to include customers with heterogeneous value functions. As in these
papers, the analysis in the present paper is based on studying the impact of policies on the
steady-state behavior of a queueing system. There have been signiﬁcant subsequent advances
concerning the existence of solutions, their stability, and the eﬀect of small disturbances on
equilibrium for these queueing systems (Stidham 1992, Friedman and Landsberg 1993 and
1996, Rump and Stidham 1998).
The present paper diverges from the traditional queueing literature by rejecting the
assumption that each additional job submitted to the facility increases the social (gross)
value. This assumption contends that at every period, either each customer uses the facility
only once, or if she accesses the service more than once, the value of each interaction is
not related to the number of jobs already submitted. Furthermore, the traditional queueing
models also assume that customers use the same estimate of waiting time when deciding
whether or not to use the service. In contrast, the present paper assumes that the value of
the relationship to the customer depends explicitly on that customer’s level of usage, the
aggregation of which results in the expected total value. Finally, this paper takes into account
the impact of past experiences on customer satisfaction and customer behavior, consistent
w i t hs t u d i e ss u c ha sB o l t o n ’ s( 1 9 9 8 ) .
Unlike the models cited in the preceding paragraphs, the queueing system developed in
this paper is controlled through service quality and a two-part pricing structure (also called
dual pricing systems or two-part tariﬀs) which consists of a subscription fee that customers
must pay in order to have access to the service and a usage fee that must be paid each time
the service is used. This pricing structure was chosen for two reasons. First, because it
can be interpreted as a generalization of subscription-only pricing or usage-only pricing by
setting one of the price parameters to zero. Second, because it is a very commonly-used tool
for price discrimination in practice (Tirole 1988), particularly in telecommunications and
ﬁnancial services, two of the industries that provided the main motivation for the present
study. The analysis of two-part pricing structures in usage-based services dates back at least
to Oi’s (1971) pioneering work in the context of Disneyland tickets. The recent increase in
the use of two-part pricing brought about by the Internet, telecommunications, and paid
5television has renewed academic and managerial interest in various facets of the subject.
Danaher (2002) built on the work of Mahajan et al. (1982) in order to ﬁnd the prices that
maximize the adoption rate of a new cellular phone service. Essegaier et al. (2002) developed
a game-theoretic model to analyze the mediating eﬀect of capacity constraints on the ﬁrm’s
optimal pricing strategy when consumers consistently behave as either “light” or “heavy”
users. The problem studied in this paper requires an innovative approach for at least two
reasons: ﬁrst, because the existing literature on two-part pricing does not address the long-
term eﬀects on the size of the customer base and proﬁtability; second, because the pricing
and service-quality decisions must be considered simultaneously, along with their impact on
customer behavior (e.g., a light user may become a heavy user if service quality improves).
The quality revolution in manufacturing spilled over to the service industry in the late
1980s and early 1990s and brought about a large number of managerial papers and books
advocating the virtues of quality-oriented companies (e.g., Reichheld and Sasser, Jr. 1990,
Reichheld and Teal 1996). The service-proﬁt chain (Heskett et al. 1994), a framework
connecting operational investments to proﬁtability through service quality, took a prominent
place in managerial circles. It did not take very long before this unprecedented high emphasis
on quality came under scrutiny. Service ﬁrms often do not experience the economies of
scale and corresponding cost reductions that were brought about by the implementation
of quality programs in manufacturing ﬁrms. Consequently, many service companies faced
the disastrous consequences of implementing ﬁnancially unsound quality programs (e.g., Hill
1993, Wiesendanger 1993). Quality is a costly investment that must be linked to proﬁtability.
The ﬁrst step in linking quality to proﬁtability involves linking quality to behavioral
intentions (repurchasing intentions, in particular). There is extensive Marketing literature
on this area (e.g., Rust and Zahorik 1993, Boulding et al. 1993). Bolton’s (1998) analysis
is particularly relevant to the present paper, as it studies the eﬀect of customer satisfaction
on loyalty, using data from a cellular communications ﬁrm. Her analysis reveals that the
eﬀect of a bad experience is smaller for customers who have been with the company longer,
a result which was further supported by Rust et al. (1999).
Hall and Porteus (2000) and Gans (2002) made key contributions in modeling and un-
derstanding the connection between quality and customer loyalty in capacity-constrained
services. In Hall’s and Porteus’ paper, customers switch between service providers based
on their past service experience. Gans builds on this work by relating a ﬁrm’s selection of
service level to the duration of a customer’s relationship with that ﬁrm. He considers the
6setting of the service level to be a strategic decision and assumes that the ﬁrm can provide
the targeted service level by adjusting its operational parameters (e.g., a call center can add
or remove service representatives or a retailer can adjust the inventory policy). The model
presented in this paper adds to this stream of research in many ways, three of which are
particularly important. First, the updating mechanism allows the customers’ current level
of satisfaction with the service provider (as measured by their estimate of the service level)
to be a function of the number of past experiences, previous estimates, and satisfaction from
the last interaction. This set of assumptions is consistent with the empirical work of Bolton
(1998) and Rust et al. (1999). Second, customers choose the depth of their relationship (op-
erationalized through the rate of interactions) based on their level of satisfaction, allowing
for the quantiﬁcation of relationship depth in a way that is not possible in a model where
interactions can only occur at predetermined points. This is an essential capability if we
want to understand the way in which depth of relationship mediates the impact of customer
satisfaction on proﬁtability. Third, the present model allows for the simultaneous optimiza-
tion of two-part pricing and service quality. This is an important managerial contribution,
as price and service-quality level can usually be controlled by managers and two-part tariﬀs
are the norm in a number of relevant industries.
Rust et al.’s (1995) Return on Quality (ROQ) framework and Kamakura et al.’s (2002)
empirical implementation of the service-proﬁt chain have established the ﬁnal link between
quality and proﬁtability. The ROQ model provided a fundamental building block by ex-
plicitly quantifying the operational costs and increases in revenue associated with quality.
Kamakura et al.(2002) took a similar approach as they incorporated quality-related costs
into their operationalization of the service-proﬁt chain. The present paper contributes to this
stream of research by explicitly considering the eﬀect of an additional phenomenon impact-
ing the ﬁnancial accountability problem: the negative impact that an investment in quality
can have on proﬁtability can actually come from the revenue side, not just the cost side.
3M o d e l D e s c r i p t i o n
3.1 Individual Customer Behavior
Customers interact with the company repeatedly over time and are capable of initiating a
service encounter whenever they choose to do so (the terms “service encounter” and “service
7interaction” are used interchangeably in this paper). The service quality experienced by the
customer during the k0th interaction is denoted by wk, which depends on the company’s
internal service-quality level (denoted by W, which can be interpreted, for example, as
the average waiting time) as well as a random factor discussed in the paragraphs below.
After each interaction, customers update their expectation of the company’s service quality
through the recursive relationship
˜ wk = αkwk +( 1− αk)˜ wk−1 (1)
where αk ∈ (0,1) is the weight assigned to the last experience. In this way, the customer’s
˜ wk can be connected to the number of previous transactions. Two important special cases
are αk = 1
k, where the service estimate is the average of all previous service experiences,
and αk = α, which corresponds to exponential smoothing. This type of Bayesian updating
mechanism where customers combine their last experience with a summary statistic of pre-
vious experiences is standard in the marketing literature and has been empirically validated
in a variety of settings (e.g., Bolton 1998). Furthermore, the αk parameter in the speciﬁc
formulation presented in Eq (1) takes into account the fact that the customers’ service-
quality estimates can depend not only on their previous estimate and the actual level of
service experienced in the last interaction, but also on the number of previous interactions,
in accordance with the ﬁndings of Bolton (1998) and Rust et al (1999) discussed in §2.
Customer satisfaction is represented by the customer’s estimate of the ﬁrm’s true service
level and is denoted by x, a random variable whose distribution is given by F (x|˜ wk)= ˜ Fk.
This assumption has its limitations, but these do not aﬀect the generality of the analytical
approach or the results of this paper. The consumers’ expectations, F (x|˜ wk),are based
on a prior ˜ w0 (which is independent of W) and on a vector of observations (w1,w 2,...,wk)
which are generated by the stochastic process governed by reality, or F (). There is no
value of W for which the consumer will never defect because the customer’s estimate of
F () will always be based on the observed realizations of this stochastic process, not on
W itself. The methodology used in this paper can be extended to accommodate estimates
and perceptions of higher moments of perceived service quality, allowing for more complex
operational deﬁnitions of ˜ Fk. In spite of its real-world appeal, this additional complexity
leads to the same results and insights, and therefore the simpler deﬁnition of customer
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Figure 1: Example of service interactions over time
available from the authors).
3.1.1 Individual Customer Dynamics
The dynamics of the customer-company interactions are summarized in Figure 2. Note
that this ﬁgure explicitly depicts how the ﬁrm’s decision variables–pu (the usage fee), ps








































































































Figure 2: Dynamics of Customer-Company interactions
At the beginning of each period, active customers (i.e., those who have not defected)
pay a subscription fee ps to renew their subscription to the service. Periods are deﬁned to
be of length T (see Figure 1), which can represent days, weeks, or months depending on
the speciﬁc application. Customers who choose to renew the subscription agree to enter a
service contract whereby they will pay usage fee pu every time they use the service. This is
one of the most frequently used pricing structures in the telecommunications industry (cf.
9Danaher 2002). Furthermore, this two-part pricing includes the case where customers pay a
ﬁxed subscription fee and have unlimited usage (pu =0 )as well as the case where there is
no subscription fee and customers only pay when they use the service (ps =0 ).
Customers use the service at the rate η, which (as depicted in Figure 2) is a function
of their level of satisfaction and the usage fee (pu) b u tn o tt h es u b s c r i p t i o nf e e(ps).I n
contrast to the models of Hall and Porteus (2000) and Gans (2002), there can be more than
one interaction per period. This is how the present model captures the customer’s choice of
depth of relationship. Figure 1 depicts a situation where there were three interactions in the
ﬁrst period and two in the second period.
The utility customers derive from each service interaction has a ﬁxed component as well
as a random component. The ﬁx e dc o m p o n e n ti sg i v e nb y(v(η) − ηpu),w h e r ev(η) is the
intrinsic beneﬁt of receiving the service at rate η for one period. The random component, de-
noted by c(w), is a function of the experienced service quality, w. Since capacity-constrained
service-delivery systems are commonly modeled as queues, quality is assumed (without loss
of generality) to be measured in terms of the waiting time, and therefore the customer utility
function is decreasing in w. In this case, the function c(w) can be interpreted as the cost of
waiting.
3.1.2 Subscription and Defection
Customers will choose to subscribe (or renew their subscription) whenever the expected
beneﬁts outweigh the expected costs–more precisely, whenever





c(x)dF (x|˜ w) (3)
is the amount of dissatisfaction due to waiting that the customers expect to experience given
their current estimate of the service level. Inequality (2) must also hold for new customers
who must decide whether or not to subscribe. Each potential customer arrives with an
expectation of service quality ˜ w0. Expectations are updated after each service encounter,
and customers defect immediately after a service encounter if their current estimate of ˜ w
does not satisfy inequality (2). In other words, a potential customer only becomes a new
10customer if inequality (2) is satisﬁed when ˜ w =˜ w0.
Even though new arrivals into the system depend strictly on an exogenous arrival rate
and are independent of pu and ps, they are implicitly endogenous in that the probability
that they will become actual customers also depends on the fees, since it is possible for a
customer to defect before paying the subscription fee and undergoing the ﬁrst interaction
(note in Figure 2 that it is possible for a new customer to go directly to the“customer defects”
stage without actually experiencing the service).
There are very few service situations where the actual mean service level W is perfectly
observable by customers. Typically, for a new customer, W would aﬀect ˜ w0 only indi-
rectly, through word-of-mouth. However, the eﬀect of word-of-mouth is often biased and can
be overwhelmed by explicit service promises (advertising, personal selling, contracts, other
communications), implicit service promises (tangibles, prices), and the customer’s past ex-
perience with other ﬁrms in the same industry as well as ﬁrms in other industries (Zeithaml,
Berry and Parasuraman 1993). With this in mind, we believe that an initial approach to the
problem where ˜ w0 is independent of W is legitimate, but that a real-world estimation of the
arrival rate should take many more factors into account.
The analysis in the sections that follow will make use of the function b
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η;ps,p u, ˜ F (·)
´
=( v(η) − ηpu) − η(¯ c(˜ w)) − ps. (4)
This function represents the customer’s expected net utility per unit of time, where the unit
is the period of length T. The way the two-part tariﬀ is incorporated into the consumer’s
decision model is consistent with recent behavioral ﬁndings that consumers devise a summary
statistic based on the cost per unit of a two-part tariﬀ and compare it with their expected
usage level (Redden and Hoch 2006). The customer will choose the usage rate η∗ that
maximizes b
³
η;ps,p u, ˜ F (·)
´




∗;ps,p u, ˜ F (·)
´
= b
∗ <b min. (5)
The threshold bmin represents the value a customer expects to receive from the competition
minus any applicable switching costs and can be set to 0 (as in (2)) without loss of generality.
Indeed, (5) can be made equivalent to the commonly-used logit and probit model by making
11particular assumptions about the functional form of b(·) and the distribution of the error
terms of the probabilistic variables. This formulation of the defection decision is consistent
with the conclusions Gupta and Zeithaml (2006) reached after examining the published liter-
ature connecting customer metrics to ﬁnancial results: there is a strong correlation between
customer satisfaction (captured here by ˜ F (·)) and customer retention. The threshold, bmin,
which represents the expected utility of switching to the competition, it is assumed to be
constant for a number of reasons. First, because customer expectations of a given ﬁrm’s ser-
vice quality are shaped by several diﬀerent factors (described in our justiﬁcation of why ˜ w0
is independent of W) according to the results of Zeithaml, Berry and Parasuraman (1993).
Second, because in most real-world applications our actual service level, W,i sn o tp e r f e c t l y
observable by the competitors, so there is no a priori reason to assume that they would
adapt their service levels optimally and rationally based on our decision of W. Finally, even
if competitors choose to adapt their service levels, these decisions can often not be made
instantaneously. The delay in the competitors’ change of capacity would then be followed by
a delay in the time until the customers’ perceptions of quality changes, making the constant
threshold a reasonable assumption given the time frame in which these decision are made
by actual ﬁrms.
3.1.3 Depth of Relationship
The next propositions present monotonicity properties of the customer’s optimal choice of
depth of relationship and the corresponding level of utility the customer derives from inter-
acting with the ﬁrm. Proposition 1 connects the customer’s optimal depth of relationship
with the ﬁrm’s decision variables, and Proposition 2 connects the customer’s expected net
utility per unit time with the ﬁrm’s decision variables.
Proposition 1 (a) The set of usage rates that maximize the expected utility per period is
nonincreasing in pu.
(b) The set of optimal usage rates is also nonincreasing in the expected waiting cost ¯ c.
(c) If the cost function c is increasing, then the set of optimal usage rates is nonincreasing
in ˜ w.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1 establishes the monotonicity of the customer’s usage of the service as a
function of the usage fee, the expected interaction cost, and the service-level estimate. The
12behavior of the expected net utility with respect to these parameters is characterized in
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (a) The expected net utility per period, b∗ =m a x η≥0 b(η),i sn o n i n c r e a s i n g
in the expected cost ¯ c. If ˜ F (x|˜ w) is decreasing in ˜ w and c(·) is nondecreasing, then b∗ is also
nonincreasing in ˜ w.
(b) The expected net utility per period is nonincreasing in both the expected value of the
usage fee pu and the periodic membership fee ps.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
This monotonicity property allows the company to use the customer’s estimate of service
level as a concrete and manageable measure of customer utility. The properties of Proposi-
tions 1 and 2 will hold for any speciﬁc form of the function v(η).D i ﬀerent types of customer
behavior can be modeled by varying the cost and the value functions. For example, a step-
increasing value function will result in a step-decreasing depth of relationship. When v(η) is
concave, the maximization problem has a unique solution (η∗), and the result of Proposition
1 applies to the unique optimal usage rate η∗.
3.2 Dynamics of Aggregate Customer Behavior
The evolution of the relationship between customers and the ﬁrm is modeled as a Markov
process, where each state is deﬁned by the number of previous interactions and the customer’s
current level of satisfaction (operationalized through the estimation of the average waiting
time). Customers remain with the company as long as b∗ >b min (as in (5)). The expected
net utility is monotonic in the current level of satisfaction, as shown in Proposition 2. Thus,
requiring the customers’ utility to be above the threshold is equivalent to requiring the
estimate ˜ w to be below ˜ wmax,w h e r e˜ wmax is implicitly deﬁned by b∗ (˜ wmax)=bmin.
In order to deﬁne a ﬁnite set of states, the interval [0, ˜ wmax] is partitioned into a set I of S
disjoint subintervals, where I = {I1,...,IS} = {[0,u 1),[l2,u 2),...,[lS,u S]},a n dui = li+1,i=
1,...,S − 1, and uS =˜ wmax. Given the monotonicity properties of the net utility function,
this partition is equivalent to partitioning the interval [b∗ (0),b min] into S subintervals. The
states are deﬁned so that a customer who has interacted with the ﬁrm k times and whose
level of satisfaction (˜ wk) falls in the interval Ii is in state (i,k). A customer in state (i,k)
who accesses the service for the (k +1 )
th time experiences service quality wk+1,u p d a t e st h e
13l e v e lo fs a t i s f a c t i o na c c o r d i n gt o( 1 ) ,a n dm o v e st os t a t e(˜ ı,k +1 ) ,w h e r e˜ ı is deﬁned so
that ˜ wk+1 ∈ I˜ ı. Figure 3 provides a representation of this model, where customers move
downward through the network while they are with the ﬁrm.
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Figure 3: Evolution of customers
The transition probabilities in this network are a function of the true distribution of
waiting time (which depends on W, the service-quality decision variable) and the customer’s
update mechanism. If the true distribution of waiting time is F(x) and the customer’s
estimate of the mean of the service quality is updated according to Equation (1), then
Pr(˜ wk+1 ≤ x|˜ wk = y)=P r
µ
wk ≤









Given that a customer is in state (i,·), ˜ w is assumed to be uniformly distributed in [li,u i),
i.e., f ˜ wk (y|˜ wk ∈ Ii)= 1
∆i,w h e r e∆i = ui − li. More precisely,
Pr( ˜ wk+1 ≤ x|˜ wk ∈ Ii)=
R ui










The transition probability pk
ij =P r{˜ wk+1 ∈ Ij|˜ wk ∈ Ii} (moving from state (i,k) to (j,k+
141))i st h e ng i v e nb y
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Note that the assumption that the estimates are uniformly distributed is asymptotically

































A scaling factor pD can be introduced into the model to account for customer defections
that are caused by exogenous factors (e.g., moving, dying) that are assumed to remain con-
stant over time (c.f. Schmittlein, Morrison and Colombo 1987). If this factor is introduced,
all transition probabilities are multiplied by (1 − pD). In what follows, it is assumed that
pD > 0 unless otherwise noted. Note, however, that the model will still converge if pD =0 ,
as the necessary condition for convergence, Pr( ˜ w>w max) > 0, is true under the assumption
that customers will not tolerate an arbitrarily low service quality.
4 System Behavior in Steady State
This section will analyze the customer base as a migration process and explain the coun-
terintuitive result that decreasing price or increasing service can result in a decrease in the
number of customers in the system. This analysis will answer questions concerning the eﬀect
of the service level and pricing on the expected duration of customer relationships, the total
number of customers, and the level of demand experienced by the service facility by modeling
the customer base as an open migration process. The company will then be analyzed as a
network of inﬁnite server queues. The states correspond to stations in the network, and the
time between interactions corresponds to service time.
The arrival process of new customers to state (i,0) at the top of the network is assumed
to be a homogeneous Poisson process with rate λ
0
i. For customers in states (i,·),t h em e a n
time between interactions is 1
ηi,w h e r eηi = 1
∆i
R ui
li η∗ (˜ w)d˜ w.S i n c e η∗ (˜ w) is a monotonic
15function of ˜ w, ηi will also be monotonic. If the time between interactions for customers in
state (j,k) has a general distribution with mean 1
ηj, then the result of Proposition 3 follows
from queueing network theory.
Proposition 3 (Arrival rate to each state) In equilibrium, the number of customers at each
state (j,k) is independent and has a Poisson distribution with parameter
λk
j
ηj ,w h e r eλ
k
j is the










i for all j : Ij ∈ ˆ I and for k =1 ,2,... (6)





i : si ∈ ¯ Ubmin
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be the vector whose elements are the arrival rates to the





be the matrix of transition
probabilities, (6) can be written as:
λk = λk−1Pk−1
= λ0P0P1 ···Pk−1.1 (7)
The demand for service will be the sum of the demand of customers at every state, so the

















This system has an inﬁnite number of states. However, the total arrival rate to the ser-
vice facility and the expected total number of customers in the system is always ﬁnite, as
established by the proposition below.
Proposition 4 (Finiteness of the total arrival rate and the expected number of customers)
16(a) The total rate of arrival to the service facility is ﬁnite.
(b) The expected total number of customers in the system is ﬁnite.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
After every interaction, some customers leave the system, and the rate of arrival to the
next level of states decreases. If customers stay long enough in the system and become
insensitive to actual realizations of service quality, the rate of arrival to the service facility
and the expected number of customers in the system could become unbounded. This is of
no concern, as it would only happen when pD =0and Pr( ˜ w>w max)=0 ,w h i c hi nt u r n
requires wmax to be unreasonably high and ak to be decreasing and tending to 0–a highly
unlikely situation in a realistic scenario.
Another question to explore is how the service level aﬀects the aggregate demand as well
as the number of customers in the system. In order to answer this question, we must explore
t h eb e h a v i o ro ft h ea r r i v a lr a t eo fc u s t o m e r sw h or e q u e s ts e r v i c ea tt h es e r v i c ef a c i l i t ya sa
function of the level of service chosen by the ﬁrm. The following proposition assumes that
F (x|W) is nonincreasing in the average waiting time W in order to derive an important
monotonicity property.
Proposition 5 The total arrival rate to the service facility is nonincreasing in W.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
An alternative approach yielding the same results is to make the more general assump-
tion that the ﬁrm selects a distribution of service levels from a family of distributions
{Fi (x),i≥ 0},w h e r et h ei n d e xi can be either discrete or continuous. In this case, it is
also necessary to assume that the distributions can be stochastically ordered so that either
Fi (x) ≥st Fj (x) or Fi (x) ≤st Fj (x), i.e., the ﬁrm selects the service level from a stochasti-
cally ordered set.
Figure 4 presents results from a numerical example (see Appendix A.2 for details) which
illustrates the eﬀect of the service level on the the ﬁrm’s customer base. Here one can observe
the counterintuitive eﬀect that as the quality of service decreases, the number of customers
does not always decrease (it may in fact increase). This eﬀe c t ,w h i c hc a nb ep r e d i c t e db yt h e
preceding analysis, can be intuitively explained as follows. As the service quality decreases,
the probability that a customer will decide to leave the company increases, and thus that
customer’s total number of interactions decreases. At the same time, the intervals between




























































































Figure 4: Eﬀect of the service level on the total number of customers for diﬀerent usage fees
(pu).
that customer’s consecutive interactions increase. The expected length of stay is deﬁned by
the relationship
E(Length of Stay)=E(Total Number of Interactions)×(Average Interval Between Interactions),
where E() denotes the mathematical expectation. The net eﬀect on the average length of
stay will depend on the relative magnitude of these two terms. According to Little’s Law,
the expected number of customers in the system will be equal to the product of the arrival
rate of potential customers and the average length of stay of each customer. Therefore, the
total expected number of customers will ultimately depend on the relative sizes of those same
opposing elements: the expected number of interactions (which goes down when quality goes
d o w n )a n dt h ea v e r a g el e n g t ho ft h ei n t e r v a l sb e t w e e nt h e m( w h i c hg o e su pw h e nq u a l i t y
goes down). As service quality decreases, the increased interval between interactions can be
high enough to oﬀset the decrease in the total number of interactions and produce a greater
total “Length of Stay,” which leads to a greater number of customers in steady state; hence,
we obtain the counterintuitive result that the size of the customer base can actually increase
when service quality goes down.













18Note that ηj does not depend on W.S i n c eηj is deﬁned as the average usage rate for cus-
tomers in state (j,k) (i.e., for customers with a given estimate of service level), ηj depends





























,i tc a nb ea ﬃrmed that N is





















When the usage rate is constant, the total number of customers in the system is also
nonincreasing in W. This property can be veriﬁed by observing that the total number of
customers, N, is bounded from above by





























with both bounds being nonincreasing in W.
The remainder of this section will examine the eﬀects of the ﬁrm’s pricing policies on
the arrivals to the service facility (service requests) and on the number of customers in the
system. It is important to note that the transition rates between states corresponding to
customers who stay in the system are functions of the service level provided by the ﬁrm and
the customers’ estimation procedure. These rates are aﬀected by neither the usage fee pu
nor the subscription fee ps. However, pricing aﬀects each customer’s decision of whether or
not to stay with the company. Intuitively, one might expect that the higher the price, the
higher the customer’s demand for service quality. In the present model this translates into
a contraction of the subspace of service-quality estimates that would be suﬃciently high for
the customer to stay with the ﬁrm.
Recall that customers stay with the company as long as their expected net utility per
19period is above a threshold bmin. For ﬁxed values of pu and ps, this is equivalent to requiring
t h ec u s t o m e r ’ se s t i m a t et ob eb e l o wac r i t i c a lv a l u ewmax (this result follows immediately
from the monotonicity property in part (a) of Proposition 2). Since the net utility per
period is also monotonic in pu and ps (part (b) of Proposition 2), it follows that wmax ˙ =w :
b∗ (w,pu,p s)=bmin is decreasing in pu and in ps. That is, in response to higher prices,
customers will demand higher levels of service. This observation leads to the next result,
which is analogous to Proposition 5, with the diﬀerence that the decision variables are now
pu and ps rather than W.
Proposition 6 The total arrival rate to the service facility is nonincreasing in both the
average usage fee pu and the subscription fee ps.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
In the case of expected number of customers in the system as a function of the usage
fee pu, there are, as was the case with service quality, two opposing eﬀects–recall that the
number of customers depends on average length of stay, which is the product of the number
of interactions and the average interval between them. Based on the monotonicity property
o ft h eu s a g er a t e( P r o p o s i t i o n1 ) ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h eu s a g ef e ew i l lp r o d u c ea ni n c r e a s ei nt h e
time between customer interactions. On the other hand, an increase in price will make the
customer’s criteria for staying in the company more stringent, which will tend to reduce the
number of interactions. Thus, the net result of an increase in price on the size of the customer
base is not necessarily monotonic (as is illustrated by the numerical example in Figure 5)
and will depend on the relative importance of those two eﬀects (number of interactions and
average interval between them). This dynamic is analogous to the one in Figure 4, and the
bounds for N obtained in (10) and (11) are also nonincreasing in pu. Note that in both
Figures 4 and 5, the number of customers increases for suﬃciently small values of the control
variable (in response to what customers might objectively consider undesirable changes in
price and service quality) before it decreases as managers might expect, so careful managerial
selection of the pricing and service-quality levels is particularly important to yield the desired
results.
The eﬀect of the subscription fee on the rate of usage is simpler to analyze. An increase
in ps will not inﬂuence the rate of usage. This result is formalized in the proposition below.
Proposition 7 The expected total number of customers in the system is nonincreasing in
the periodic membership fee ps.








































pu (usage fee, in $/interaction)








































pu (usage fee, in $/interaction)
Figure 5: Eﬀect of the usage fee on the total number of customers for diﬀerent levels of
service (W, average waiting time, in hours).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
5P r o ﬁt Optimization
This section examines how price and service quality aﬀect proﬁtability. The previous section
has shown that the size of the customer base in steady state is non-monotonic in the service
quality and usage fee. As mentioned earlier, this result raises questions concerning the
adequacy of maximizing the size of the customer base or using the size of the customer base
as a proxy for proﬁtability in the long run, since fewer customers sometimes yield higher
proﬁts. This section provides a rigorous approach to the issue of proﬁt maximization.
T h ef u n c t i o nt ob em a x i m i z e di st h er a t ea tw h i c hp r o ﬁt is generated in steady state.
The revenue per period, denoted R,i sg i v e nb y
R = λpu + Nps.
Let C (λ,W) be the cost per period of providing service level W to a set of customers arriving
at rate λ. C (λ,W) is assumed to be increasing in λ and decreasing and convex in W.T h e
21proﬁt optimization problem can then be formulated as the following nonlinear program:
maxΠ = λpu + Nps − C (λ,W)
s.t.
λ = g(pu,p s,W),N = h(pu,p s,W),W ≥ 0.
The restrictions on λ and N correspond to the implicit functions for the arrival rate and
the size of the customer base, derived in (8) and (9) respectively.
Let
L = Π − γ1 [g(pu,p s,W) − λ] − γ2 [h(pu,p s,W) − N],
where γ1 and γ2 a r eL a g r a n g em u l t i p l i e r s .U s i n gt h en o t a t i o nw h e r eyx is the partial deriv-
ative of ywith respect to x, the necessary optimality conditions are given by the following
set of equations:
λ − γ1gpu − γ2hpu =0 ,N − γ1gps − γ2hps =0 , −CW − γ1gW − γ2hW =0 ,
pu − Cλ + γ1 =0 ,p s + γ2 =0 ,
g(pu,p s,W) − λ =0 ,h (pu,p s,W) − N =0 , and W ≥ 0.








































These equations are analogous to equating marginal revenues with marginal costs for each of
the three decision variables: service quality W in (12), usage fee pu in (13), and subscription
fee ps in (14).
The LHS of (12) reveals that the marginal revenues due to improving service quality can
be decomposed into two parts. The ﬁrst part corresponds to the eﬀect of service quality on
the arrival rate into the service facility (service requests). The second part corresponds to
22the eﬀect of service quality on the number of customers in the system. Proposition 5 asserts
that the arrival rate is nonincreasing in W, but the size of the customer base can be either
increasing or decreasing, as illustrated in Figure 4. The impact of an increase in service
quality on proﬁtability will depend on the relative size of these eﬀects (changes in the arrival
rate and the number of customers) in light of the prices. Note that the cost side has two
terms. This is because increasing the service quality has a direct eﬀect on costs (providing
good service is assumed to be more costly than providing bad service) as well as an indirect
eﬀect (service quality has an eﬀect on how many customers will demand the service).
In Equation (13)the marginal revenue gained from increasing the usage fee is decomposed
into three parts. The ﬁrst is the direct eﬀect of a price increase on the revenue. This is the
additional revenue gained assuming that the number of customers demanding service will
remain constant in spite of the price diﬀerence. The second and third parts correspond to






is the simplest to understand, since the result of Proposition 6
guarantees that the arrival rate is nonincreasing in pu. The last term, on the other hand,
cannot be understood as intuitively. As depicted in Figure 5, increasing the usage fee can
have a positive or a negative impact on the size of the customer base. As in the case of the
waiting time, an increase in pu may also result in an increase or a decrease in proﬁtability.
Finally, Equation (14) showsthat the marginal revenue gained from increasing the sub-
scription fee is decomposed into three parts. The ﬁrst is the direct eﬀect of a price increase
on the revenue due to the number of customers that will be paying the subscription fee
in steady state (i.e., the size of the customer base). The second and third terms on the
LHS correspond to the indirect eﬀects. Propositions 6 and 7 ensure that both ∂λ
∂ps and ∂N
∂ps
are negative, making this the most intuitive of the optimality conditions, as the dynamics
involved are the same ones found in traditional pricing problems.
6D i s c u s s i o n
This paper provides an important building block for understanding the underlying structure
of the dynamics governing the impact of price and service quality on customer satisfaction
and proﬁtability. Changes in price and service quality that provide more value to customers
sometimes result in fewer rather than more customers in the long run. Another puzzling
phenomenon has been that in some cases where the size of the customer base actually has
23increased as expected, managers have been observing proﬁts go down. This paper provides an
explanation for these phenomena and recommends actions that will enable managers to act
optimally under these circumstances. The key factor driving the results is the incorporation
of a variable that captures each customer’s depth of relationship, chosen according to each
individual’s perception of service quality.
In a wider context, the analysis addresses the issue of customer interface design from the
perspective of a long-term relationship between a company and its clients. Service quality
plays a key role in long-term relationships: it acts as one of the main drivers of customer
satisfaction, which in turn determines loyalty and hence the length of the relationship itself.
Companies must carefully manage their service-quality levels in order to diﬀerentiate their
service oﬀerings. Fee structures also play a determining role in long-term relationships, as
pricing exerts a large inﬂuence on the customers’ frequency of interaction and propensity to
defect.
The focus of this paper is on the impact of service quality and fee structures on customer
behavior and the resulting eﬀect on the long-term value of customer relationships to the ﬁrm,
in order to provide insights into the design of customer interfaces (choosing fees and service
quality) to optimize proﬁtability. In particular, the results explain the interdependence of
the pricing structure, service level, and long-term behavior of customers and quantify the
eﬀect of these collective factors on the expected utilization of the service facility, the size of
the customer base, and the revenues.
The most intriguing result of this paper relates to the fact that the number of clients that
a company will have does not necessarily increase as service quality increases. In order to
explain this phenomenon, the analysis in §4 reveals that the number of clients at any given
p o i n ti nt i m ed e p e n d so nt h er a t ea tw h i c hn e wc u s t o m e r sa r ea c q u i r e da n dt h ea v e r a g e
length of their relationship with the company. The length of the relationship, in turn, is
determined by the total number of interactions multiplied by the average time between
interactions. If the service level falls below a certain threshold, customers leave. As the
level of service decreases, the number of interactions decreases because the probability that
the customer will cross the threshold will increase. However, the length of time between
interactions will also increase because customers will not use the service as often as they
would if the service level were higher. The increase in the average length of time between
interactions can oﬀset and even surpass the decrease in the total number of interactions.
Companies that earn revenues each time the customer uses their service are worse oﬀ in this
24situation (they would proﬁt better from making decisions which maximize the number of
interactions). Companies that charge a subscription fee, on the other hand, can be better
oﬀ: they decrease their operational costs due to the reduced number of interactions while
simultaneously increasing their customer base. This result is rather unintuitive and serves
to show the value of mathematical analysis in devising and implementing strategic policies.
The models developed in this paper can help managers design the way in which the ﬁrm
will interact with its customers. These models can be used to evaluate the consequences
of decisions–such as changes in service quality, fee structures, and product quality–in
terms of customer retention, revenues, and costs. These are high-level decisions that have
important implications regarding the type of customers that companies attract and retain,
which in turn determines the company’s sources of revenue. The result that lower levels of
quality may lead to a larger customer base and higher proﬁtability is of great interest to
managers deciding how to position their services in light of their competitors’ oﬀers and the
expectations of their target market.
The ﬁndings of this paper open the way for a number of new research opportunities.
One possible extension is to incorporate the impact of marketing expenditure on the arrival
rate of new customers. It would be interesting to investigate the case where the impact is
made constantly over time as well as the eﬀect of a single campaign on the steady state of
the system. This paper can also be extended to the case where the ﬁrm interacts with a
heterogeneous customer base. If the customer base can be divided into discrete segments
that can be targeted separately, the ﬁrm’s control problem reduces to simple replications of
the one solved in this paper. However, the problem becomes more complex as the represen-
tation of heterogeneity and the addressability of individual customers become more diﬃcult.
Developing this paper’s model into a decision-support tool for controlling the customer in-
terface, compatible with various models of customer heterogeneity, is a rich research topic
worth pursuing. Finally, generalizing the results of this paper to the case where customers





Proof. The proofs are trivial under the assumptions that v(η) is concave and c(˜ w),t h e
expectation of the function c (given by (3)), is increasing in ˜ w. These assumptions are quite
robust for most applications. For the general case, assuming b is smooth we have ∂2b
∂η∂pu ≤ 0.
It then follows from Topkis (1978) that b has decreasing diﬀerences in (η,pu) and therefore
b∗ (η) is nonincreasing in pu. This proves part (a). For part (b), we note that ∂2b
∂η∂c ≤ 0 and
the result follows from the same argument used above. Finally, for part (c), note that if
∂¯ c
∂ ˜ w > 0 then b has decreasing diﬀerences in (η, ˜ w),s i n c e ∂2b
∂η∂ ˜ w = ∂2b
∂η∂¯ c
∂¯ c
∂ ˜ w ≤ 0.
Proposition 2
Proof. The proof for this proposition is based on the envelope theorem. For part (a),
ﬁr s tn o t et h a t∂b∗
∂¯ c =
∂b(¯ c,η)
∂¯ c = −η,where η ∈ η∗ (¯ c).B y d e ﬁnition, η ≥ 0, and therefore,
∂b∗
∂¯ c ≤ 0.I f c is increasing, ∂¯ c
∂ ˜ w ≥ 0,i m p l y i n gt h a t
∂b(˜ w,η)




∂ ˜ w ≤ 0. The argument
when c is decreasing is symmetric, concluding the proof of part (a). For part (b), note that
∂b∗
∂pu = ∂b
∂pu = −η.S i n c eη ≥ 0, it follows that ∂b∗
∂pu ≤ 0. For the membership fee, ps,w es i m p l y
note that ∂b∗
∂ps = ∂b
∂ps = −1 < 0.
Proposition 3
Proof. Follows immediately from Kelly (1979).
Proposition 4
Proof. For part (a), to see that λ is always ﬁnite we can check that limt→∞
λk+1e
λke < 1










Next, note that the sum of every row of Pk is less than 1 as long as there exists a level of ser-
vice that will cause at least one customer to defect (an assumption which is trivially satisﬁed
in practice if customers will not tolerate an arbitrarily low level of service). Therefore, every




λke < 1. For part (b), assuming that customers
require a positive expected utility and that v(0) = 0, f ≥ 0 implies that at every state the
access rate ηj is positive (ηj =0implies a nonpositive utility). Then, the expected number






















j is ﬁnite (part (a)), we conclude that N is also
ﬁnite.
Proposition 5
Proof. If customers base their decisions on the ﬁrst moment of the distribution of waiting

























For any W1 <W 2,
F
µ





























for i =1 ,...,S,a n df o re v e r yk ≥ 0, the sum of every row of Pk(W1) is greater or equal to
the sum of every row of Pk(W2).I tt h e nf o l l o w sf r o m( 7 )a n d( 8 )t h a tλ(W1) ≥ λ(W2).
Proposition 6
Proof. The probability that a customer in state st

























Let wmax (pu,p s) ˙ =w : b∗ (w,pu,p s)=bmin. For any pu ≤ pu2 and any ps, wmax (pu1,p s) ≥



























27Then, for every t ≥ 0, the sum of every row of Pt(pu1) is greater or equal to the sum of every
row of Pt(pu2), and from (7) and (8) it follows that λ(pu1) ≥ λ(pu2). Analogously, for any















































i , pij does not depend on
ps,a n d¯ Ubmin is decreasing in ps, it follows that for every (j,k), λ
k
j is also decreasing in ps.
Since for every j, ηj ≥ 0, the result follows.
A.2 Parameters for simulations
In Figure 4 the customers’ utility functions are given by v(η)=k1
√
η, the waiting cost
is given by c(x)=k2x2, and the customers’ estimates of waiting time are exponentially




¯ wxdx =2 k2 ¯ w2 and η∗ = k1
2(p+2k2 ¯ w2)
2.
The value of the parameters is given by W =0 .5, α =0 .6, β =0 , pD =0 .5 ×10−3, k1 =1 2 ,
k2 =2 , bmin =0 , and ps =2 .
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